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A Changing UK in a Changing Europe: The UK
State between European Union and Devolution
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Abstract
Two issues currently dominate the UK’s constitutional landscape: the UK’s membership of
the European Union (EU) on the one hand; and the unsettled constitutional settlements
between the UK and the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
on the other. This article considers these two issues in concert. It stresses the distinct relation-
ships between the EU and the devolved territories within the UK—concerning both devolved
and non-devolved policy areas—highlighting the salience of a devolved perspective in any
consideration of UK–EU relations. Despite its importance, sensitivity to this has been lacking.
The article explores the implications of a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ outcome on the future of the
internal territorial dynamics within the UK. While there are too many unknowns to be
certain of anything, that there will be knock-on effects is, however, beyond doubt.
Keywords: European Union, United Kingdom, devolution, constitutional settlements, EU ref-
erendum
Introduction
There are two constitutional stories playing
out in the UK. The ﬁrst is the UK’s member-
ship of the European Union (EU). The sec-
ond concerns the unstable constitutional
settlements between the UK and the
devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland. Although these two
issues have largely been addressed in isola-
tion from one another, there is a close con-
nection between them. When the electorate
goes to the ballot boxes this year, it is not
only the UK–EU relationship that will be at
stake. Indeed, the future shape of two unions
will be hanging in the balance: the EU on
the one hand; the UK on the other. The EU
referendum result will feed into both of
these, whether a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ result is
returned.
Despite the Westminster doctrine of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, the UK is not a unitary
state. Like the EU itself, it is a union of dis-
tinct territories. Since the late 1990s, this ter-
ritorial differentiation has been expressed
more assertively through evolving legislative
and jurisdictional infrastructures, providing
for varying levels of political, legal and judi-
cial autonomy for Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland. However, the distinctive-
ness of the four nations goes far beyond the
institutional architecture established as part
of the devolution process. Indeed, the devo-
lution settlements are but one articulation of
difference that is also expressed through lan-
guage, culture and religion, and shaped by
different historical legacies that date back
centuries. So, while the UK joined the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 as
a single member state, this unitary status
masks a complex and evolving constitutional
conﬁguration within the UK that has only
become more pronounced over time.
As well as having a distinct status within
the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire-
land have distinct relationships with the EU.
These affect both devolved competences and
non-devolved areas where EU policy and
activity have a particular impact on them.
Institutional mechanisms have developed to
deal with these. So the impact of the EU ref-
erendum will vary across the four nations
and the Union itself, whether the UK votes
to ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’.
This article explores the different relation-
ships between the EU and the devolved
territories within the UK. It analyses the
renegotiation process with particular
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
The Political Quarterly
P
O
Q
U
1
2
2
6
0
D
is
pa
tc
h:
25
.4
.1
6
C
E
:
Jo
u
r
n
a
l
C
o
d
e
M
a
n
u
s
c
r
ip
t
N
o
.
N
o.
of
pa
ge
s:
8
P
E
:
© The Authors 2016. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2016
Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 1
reference to the political priorities of the
devolved administrations, and then unpacks
the implications of a ‘Leave’ or ‘Remain’ out-
come on the future of the internal territorial
dynamics within the UK.
A changing UK and the UK’s
multidimensional relationship
with Europe
Devolution in 1999 represented a step-
change in the relationship of the component
territories to the United Kingdom, but it was
not a once-and-for-all-time event. Rather,
relationships have continued to develop as
the devolved bodies have gained more pow-
ers and political alignments have shifted. At
present, Westminster and the devolved
territories all have governments of different
political complexions, reﬂected in distinct
attitudes to Europe. This cross-territory dis-
tinction is seen between the attitudes of both
the political elite and the public (see Jeffery
et al., this issue). Interestingly, however, in
any one territory, there is not a consistent
correlation between these groups in their
support for the EU.
The strongest support for Europe is found
in Scotland, where the two largest parties,
the Scottish National Party (SNP) and the
Labour party, both switched to pro-Eur-
opean positions in the 1980s. Even among
Conservatives, euroscepticism is muted.
Business, trades unions and civil society tend
to support Europe. Public attitudes are less
europhile but polls have suggested a persis-
tent gap between Scotland and England,
with Scottish voters of all parties less likely
to back Brexit. As of March 2016, the only
elected UKIP representative in Scotland was
a Member of the European Parliament
(MEP), who gained the sixth seat in 2014. So
the old ‘permissive consensus’ on Europe
has so far held up. Scottish governments of
both political colours (Labour–Liberal coali-
tion and SNP) have been active on the Euro-
pean scene and the Scottish Parliament has a
statutory European and External Affairs
Committee. Well in advance of the referen-
dum, the Scottish government made an
unequivocal choice to support ‘Remain’. The
Scottish Parliament elections of May 2016
did not provide a distraction, since it was
widely assumed that the SNP would win
these comfortably without needing to trim
its pro-European stance.
The Northern Ireland situation is very dif-
ferent. Until January 2016 the issue of Brexit
within Northern Ireland was scarcely visible
in political debate (and especially among
unionist politicians) as attention was more
focused on the May 2016 elections for the
Northern Ireland Assembly. The interest here
centred on whether the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP) or Sinn Fein would emerge as
the largest political party and lay claim to
the title of First Minister. David Cameron’s
deal in February 2016, however, forced all
political parties and the media in Northern
Ireland to engage with the EU referendum.
The possibilities of a Brexit raise truly funda-
mental issues for Northern Ireland, as it is
the only part of the UK to share a land bor-
der (some 300 miles) with another EU mem-
ber state. A Brexit would in theory see the
creation of a hard border between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which
would raise particular economic and political
challenges. Particular concerns lie in the
impact on cross-border trade and travel,
issues of policing (including extradition and
access to the Schengen information System
[SIS]) and the future of ﬁnancial support for
the agricultural sector. The referendum
proved to be a challenge for politicians and
the regional media.
The three largest political parties, namely
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn
Fein (SF) and the Ulster Unionist Party
(UUP), are historically eurosceptic. Internal
party tensions and frictions over the EU
ensured that both the DUP and the UUP did
not seek to engage the public in any Brexit
debate before the details of Cameron’s nego-
tiations became public. However, while the
DUP encouraged their members to vote to
leave the EU, the UUP came out in favour of
the UK remaining in the EU. Sinn Fein, as
the largest nationalist party, had also
avoided public discussion until December
2015, before advocating support for the UK’s
continued EU membership to avoid further
‘partitioning’ the island were the UK to leave
the EU. Only the Social Democratic and
Labour Party (SDLP), with some smaller
forces such as the Green party, have consis-
tently favoured EU membership. UKIP has a
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presence in the region but remains a very
minor force, with only one Member of the
Northern Ireland Assembly and two council-
lors. In retrospect, the political architecture
provided for under the devolution settle-
ment—which created a mandatory coalition
involving the main parties—prevented the
development of a consistent and purposeful
approach to the EU arena. In contrast to the
Scottish model, a European committee was
not established and instead EU issues
became one of over a dozen areas falling
under the responsibility of the Ofﬁce of First
Minister and Deputy First Minister. Ulti-
mately, the different visions of EU engage-
ment explain the inability of the Northern
Ireland executive to express its view on the
referendum.
Visiting ofﬁcials and ministers from both
Dublin and London have often been sur-
prised at the scant interest in the EU arena
so often displayed within the Northern Ire-
land executive and the Assembly. Ultimately,
this lack of proactive engagement on EU
issues prevented any meaningful inter-
changes between the Northern Ireland execu-
tive and the British government over the
latter’s negotiations with Brussels. Mostly
engagement was more reactive where the
Northern Ireland Assembly was responding
to others, for example as part of the House
of Lords EU Select Committee. Concerns
about Brexit have been considerably stronger
in the Republic of Ireland, where both gov-
ernment and most other political parties
never concealed their desire for the UK to
remain a member of the EU.
The Welsh case provides yet another per-
spective. Political and media attention has
been more engaged with the ongoing saga of
further devolution as proposed under the
most recent Wales Bill, along with the
upcoming 2016 National Assembly for Wales
elections, than with the EU question. How-
ever, the EU theme is attracting growing
interest and increasingly statements are
being made about the beneﬁts of the UK’s
EU membership for Wales and implications
of a British exit from the EU. In particular,
the possible consequences for funding and
for the farming community have been
stressed, and as with both Northern Ireland
and Scotland, there is an emerging farming
lobby that supports membership. In contrast
to Northern Ireland, there is a much stronger
European awareness among the political
elite, and the political executive—headed by
the First Minister Carwyn Jones (Labour)—
has clearly made the case for EU member-
ship and articulated that there would be
‘devastating consequences’ in the case
of Brexit. Jones contributed to the House of
Lords enquiry, arguing strongly in favour
of the UK’s continued EU membership.
Strong support for EU membership is also
reﬂected among Liberal Democrat and Plaid
Cymru Assembly members, with a majority
of the sixty members of the National Assem-
bly for Wales supporting continued member-
ship. Notable exceptions include the leader
of the Conservative party in Wales, Andrew
R. T. Davies.
The National Assembly for Wales initiated
an inquiry into the UK government’s EU
reform agenda, what impact it might have
on devolved competences in Wales and how
far the UK government was involving the
devolved administrations. One outcome of
this inquiry is a letter from the Chair of the
Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Com-
mittee, David Melding, to the UK Europe
Minister. This expresses disappointment with
the UK government’s lack of consultation
and engagement with the devolved legisla-
tures during the reform agenda negotiations;
similar complaints have come from Scotland
and Northern Ireland. More effective engage-
ment post-referendum is requested, whether
in the context of exit negotiations or, in the
case of a ‘Remain’ vote, decision-making
under the new settlement. Despite the invest-
ment in and awareness of the EU question
among the political elite, opinion polls have
shown euroscepticism in Wales approaching
English levels (in contrast to Scotland), with
UKIP presenting a credible challenge in the
May 2016 elections for the National Assem-
bly for Wales.
Relations with the EU
The multinational character of the UK has
resulted in the establishment of distinct rela-
tionships between the EU and Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland respectively.
These relationships pre-date the devolution
process and extend beyond the areas of
devolved competence, to include centrally
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governed areas that are of particular concern
to the UK’s smaller nations.
Prior to devolution, there were a number
of channels through which the interests of
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland could
be represented on a European stage. These
were rolled over into the post-devolution
era. The ﬁrst was the European Parliamen-
tary elections in 1979, which elected MEPs
from across the UK, respecting national terri-
torial boundaries. The vast majority of the
UK’s MEPs are from English constituencies.
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, how-
ever, each comprise a constituency for Euro-
pean elections, and MEPs from Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland have some
incentives to cooperate with each other
across party lines, to promote their national
interest.
Second, the EU’s own Committee of the
Regions (CoR) provides a formal (albeit rela-
tively weak) channel for Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland to articulate their distinc-
tive policy positions within Europe. Estab-
lished in 1994, the CoR is charged with the
representation of regional and local interests
in EU decision-making. As ‘regions’ within
the EU, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire-
land all have representatives within this
institution, which has pursued an agenda of
Europe of the Regions. Scotland and Wales
have also sought recognition as part of the
movement of Regions with Legislative Pow-
ers (RegLeg), differentiating themselves from
the administrative regions and local govern-
ments that are also represented in CoR.
Post-devolution there was increased scope
for the devolved nations to assert themselves
more proactively in Europe. The existing
Scottish representation in Brussels through
Scotland Europa (a platform for civil society
representation established in the 1990s) was
matched with a delegation representing the
Scottish government. Wales established
Wales House, which is home to the Welsh
government delegation, the National Assem-
bly’s EU Ofﬁce, the Welsh Local Govern-
ment Association and the Welsh Higher
Education Brussels ofﬁce, and the Northern
Ireland executive opened its own ofﬁce in
Brussels in 2001. These all serve to give voice
to the particular policy positions of the
devolved administrations and are well
placed to establish networks of individuals
and organisations who can work in the
national interest, as well as relaying valuable
information from Brussels back to Edin-
burgh, Cardiff and Belfast. These interests go
beyond areas of devolved competence,
reﬂecting the socioeconomic status, key
industries, political priorities and relative
size of the devolved nations. Some of these
issues are common across the three nations,
while others are conﬁned to one or two.
Unsurprisingly, the single market—a non-
devolved area—is a central concern for Scot-
land, Wales and Northern Ireland. Given
that all three are small territories, the single
market has a pivotal role to play both in
promoting trade and encouraging inward
investment. It is widely held that access to
the single market is a key selling point for
international companies to locate in Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland. The EU’s Struc-
tural Funds have been prominent, especially
in Wales and Northern Ireland. While the
UK’s interpretation of additionality means
that these do not represent additional
moneys to those coming through the Barnett
Formula, they have raised the salience of
Europe and drawn economic and social
actors into European networks. They have
also ensured a continued commitment to
regional development policy.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
has been of central importance to farmers
across the UK. Agriculture is a key industry
in Wales and Northern Ireland and has dis-
tinct characteristics in Scotland, and the
devolved administrations have been able to
use the leeway they have to shape the details
of its reform in signiﬁcant ways. There are
also divergent attitudes towards the social
dimension of the EU within the UK, with
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
inclined to favour the EU’s more socially
minded policies and Westminster more resis-
tant. Another salient issue is environmental
policy, which is both Europeanised and
devolved. Finally, it is important to highlight
the particularly important role the EU has
played in supporting peace and reconcilia-
tion in Northern Ireland since 1995 through
its unique Peace Programme initiative. Peace
IV was launched in early 2016 and sees a
further €270 million (actual additional
money) being earmarked for speciﬁcally
cross-border initiatives.
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There are arrangements for the devolved
governments to make a contribution to the
formulation of UK European policy, but
these are weak in comparison to those in
federal states such as Germany and Belgium.
The devolved authorities may participate in
the UK delegation to the Council of the
European Union where devolved matters are
at issue, but they represent the UK as a
whole and not themselves individually, and
are very rarely given the opportunity to lead
the delegation. They are consulted on the
line the UK will take through the Joint
Ministerial Committee (Europe), consisting of
ministers from all four governments, but the
UK government has the ﬁnal say. They are
also able to participate in the ofﬁcial-level
preparatory bodies, where their inﬂuence is
generally in proportion to the quality of their
contribution. The ofﬁces of the devolved
administrations are part of the United King-
dom Permanent Representation (UKREP)
‘family’ in Brussels, which gives them diplo-
matic status and access to some key papers.
Under the SNP, the Scottish government has
regularly complained about the restrictions
on its role and demanded more ‘direct’ rep-
resentation. In fact, direct representation is
only open to member states, and what they
really seem to be claiming is a right to attend
the Council of the EU and to lead the dele-
gations on matters, such as ﬁsheries, where
they have the biggest stake. Since the line
will still be set by the UK, this is largely
symbolic. Moreover, while participation in
the Council of the EU does give them pres-
ence, it also restricts them since they cannot
publicly disagree with the line taken.
In Germany, by contrast, the L€ander must
consent to the negotiating position where
devolved matters are concerned, using
majority voting through the Bundesrat (Fed-
eral Council) if necessary. The Belgium pro-
vision is even stronger, as all the relevant
governments (federal, regional and commu-
nity) must agree on matters that affect their
competences. Even were this approach
acceptable to the United Kingdom, it could
not in practice be applied, given that there is
no government to speak for England; only a
fully federalised UK could address this prob-
lem. Strengthening the position of the
devolved administrations in relation to
devolved matters also would not address the
issue of their particular interests in reserved
matters such as migration, freedom of move-
ment or regulation.
Renegotiation and reform: a
devolved perspective?
Cameron’s efforts to secure a ‘good deal for
Britain’ through the EU renegotiation and
referendum have taken much of his time
and energies since his re-election as Prime
Minister in May 2015. As shown above, the
devolved dimension is highly signiﬁcant in
any such deliberation because issues about
EU membership that may resonate for Lon-
don may not necessarily be the most impor-
tant aspects for other constituent parts of the
UK. The devolved nations did make a coor-
dinated approach to the UK government
when the negotiations started, but their
involvement has been limited. There is some
consultation through the Joint Ministerial
Committee (Europe) but there was nothing
equivalent to the provisions for devolved
participation that apply in regular EU nego-
tiations. The House of Lords EU Committee
has argued forcefully that ‘given the pro-
found implications for the nations of the UK
of a referendum on membership of the EU,
it is vital that the government engage fully
with the devolved institutions during the
negotiations’. Moreover, it stated that these
three devolved administrations should not
be handed a fait accompli by Whitehall but
ought to be ‘closely involved in negotiations
so as to ensure that the speciﬁc interests of
the nations of the UK are taken into
account’.
Minister for Europe, David Lidington,
claimed to be keeping in close touch with
the three devolved administrations but in
practice the degree of meaningful engage-
ment is debatable, and has been criticised in
both Cardiff and Edinburgh. Lidington
refused to give evidence to the Scottish Par-
liament’s European and External Relations
Committee about Cameron’s negotiations.
With much of the government’s negotiations
having been conducted behind closed doors,
given their sensitivity and the need to keep
Cameron’s eurosceptic critics guessing, seri-
ous issues can be raised over the trans-
parency and accountability of the process
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and how this approach has hindered and
will continue to hinder interchanges with the
devolved administrations.
Of the three devolved territories, Scotland
has been the most vocal regarding its own
distinct EU priorities under devolution (for
example, scrutinising EU legislation, creating
a European committee, establishing an ofﬁce
in Brussels and the Scottish government’s
comprehensive reports on ‘Scotland in the
EU’). As such, it has demonstrated its inten-
tion to be a proactive player and to be heard
by London. The SNP government regularly
expresses its commitment to EU membership
and, given its sizeable presence in the House
of Commons, has arguably the greatest abil-
ity of the three devolved territories to be
heard in London. There have been interac-
tions between the Minister for Europe and
Scottish ministers in Edinburgh in a way
that has not been replicated in Northern Ire-
land or Wales. As the EU dimension had
formed part of the Scottish independence ref-
erendum debate, the public, media and polit-
ical parties were aware and prepared to
enter debates on Brexit and to consider the
possible implications of a UK vote to leave,
including a new referendum on Scottish
independence.
Another point to note here is the potential
confusion and cross-contamination between
multiple, overlapping campaigns. Now set
for Thursday 23 June 2016, the EU referen-
dum will take place just seven weeks after
the national elections in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland. The leaders from all three
devolved administrations articulated their
dissatisfaction with the chosen timing, given
the risk of a blurring of the campaigns
attached to the two votes, but such expres-
sions of concern were ignored by Downing
Street.
Post-referendum scenarios
The territorial dimension to the UK’s rela-
tionship with Europe will remain important
whatever the outcome of the referendum
vote. Only if all four parts of the United
Kingdom vote to leave will the issue not
arise. Opinion polls, however, have shown
consistent majorities in Scotland and North-
ern Ireland in favour of remaining, so that
there is a possibility that they would vote to
remain while England, and thus the UK as a
whole, votes to leave.
The Scottish National Party have indicated
that such an outcome would constitute the
material change of circumstances that would
justify them calling a new independence ref-
erendum. Indeed, the threat of being taken
out of the EU against the will of the Scottish
people was a theme they deployed in the
2014 referendum on Scottish independence.
It is not clear, however, that the desire to
remain in the EU would be enough to swing
sufﬁcient voters to give a convincing major-
ity for independence. Recent polls have sug-
gested that the scenario might push support
up to the mid-ﬁfties, but that is before the
difﬁculties have been rehearsed.
While Brexit could give a justiﬁcation for a
new independence push, it would actually
undermine the independence-in-Europe pol-
icy that has been the SNP’s mainstay for the
past thirty years. That was predicated on
both the UK and Scotland being within the
EU, so allowing common policies on key
economic and regulatory matters without a
political union, and keeping an open border.
The prospect of a hard EU border with
England and Scotland would make indepen-
dence more difﬁcult to sell and force Scots to
make an explicit choice between the two
unions. The SNP does not therefore see this
as an auspicious circumstance for indepen-
dence.
The UK being out and Scotland in the EU
could also threaten the continued ties with
the UK that made independence easier to
sell in 2014. This includes the currency union
and common regulatory frameworks that
converted separation into ‘independence-lite’.
It would also be necessary for Scotland to
establish a clearer position of its own with
regard to its role in Europe and the degree
of integration it wanted. The independence
proposals of 2014 envisaged keeping the
same opt-outs as the UK currently has, on
the euro, Schengen and Justice and Home
Affairs. This would have enabled it to retain
elements of the old UK union, including the
passport-free border, but retaining these
links with a non-member state could be
much more difﬁcult, especially if European
and UK policies started to diverge.
Were Northern Ireland to vote to remain
but be pulled out by England, it would
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increase tensions, especially if the two com-
munities had voted in different ways. Brexit
could unwittingly damage relations between
the two communities and in turn key ele-
ments of the political settlement within
Northern Ireland. It would impose a hard
EU border with the Republic of Ireland,
going against the spirit of the settlement.
Cross-border institutions would ﬁnd it more
difﬁcult to work across an EU border. UK
and Irish ministers would no longer meet
regularly in European forums, a venue that
has proved valuable in the past in providing
a neutral place for encounters. More gener-
ally, European membership has allowed for
a dilution of the concept of sovereignty in
Ireland, as sovereignty is shared at multiple
levels, lowering the stakes in the old battles
between Irish uniﬁcation and UK unionism.
Sinn Fein regard Brexit as an opportunity for
Irish re-uniﬁcation. The argument runs that
were the nationalist community to have
voted heavily in favour of Europe, and
assuming the UK had voted to leave the EU,
demands would intensify for a border poll
on Northern Ireland’s status within the UK.
This would be politically sensitive and divi-
sive, but is a possibility, and one that many
unionists are not reluctant to acknowledge.
Were Scotland to leave the UK, there
would be knock-on implications for Wales as
England’s ‘junior partner’ within Britain.
Indeed, losing the balancing role of Scotland
would likely inspire a more proactive asser-
tion of nationalism within Wales, and the
further unsettling of the union.
Brexit would require the UK to decide on
its future relationship with Europe (see Chal-
mers, this issue). One option is membership
of the European Economic Area; another is
to go it alone, without a special relationship
with Europe. The devolved administrations
might prefer the former, in line with their
preference to keep their European links, but
the decision would be for the UK govern-
ment to take, presumably without a direct
say for the constituent parts. Nor would they
be likely to have a role in the details of
negotiations should the UK opt for a new
relationship with Europe outside the EU
framework.
Another effect of Brexit would be that
powers currently devolved but subject to
European law would be repatriated not just
to London but to Edinburgh, Belfast and
Cardiff. Swathes of law and policy in areas
including agriculture and ﬁsheries, environ-
ment, and higher education (including tui-
tion fees) and some social beneﬁts would be
repatriated to the devolved administrations
who could choose, if they wished, to align
policies in these ﬁelds with London or with
Brussels.
A UK vote to remain in Europe could
avoid some of these issues but pose others.
Were England to vote narrowly to leave, the
Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland votes
could swing the overall result in favour of
‘Remain’. We know that there is a certain
alignment of English nationalism with
euroscepticism (see Jeffery et al., this issue).
English people who most strongly identify
as English tend to be against Europe, com-
pared with those who see themselves as Bri-
tish. English opinion has been exercised
increasingly over the issue of Scottish MPs
voting on English matters, while both the
SNP and Labour opposed the change in
standing orders in 2015 requiring an English
majority for laws applying only in England.
Even after that, Scottish MPs can vote on the
ﬁnal stage of English legislation, allowing
them to participate in a blocking majority.
There has also been resentment against what
is seen as the Scottish advantage in public
spending. A grievance over the EU would
add to these discontents, further destabilis-
ing the union and feeding English national-
ism.
A vote to remain in the EU could also
return attention to the different views of Eur-
ope in the various parts of the United King-
dom. Whatever the outcome of the vote,
David Cameron’s negotiations appear to
have secured what amounts to a permanent
opt-out of future moves to more integration
in Europe. The UK is destined to be a semi-
detached member of the EU, keen on the sin-
gle market but suspicious of EU action in
other ﬁelds, including notably migration and
the social dimension. The Scottish and Welsh
governments, on the other hand, are in
favour of a more social Europe and, in Scot-
land, this extends to almost the entire parlia-
ment and likely future governments. The
main Scottish parties (SNP and Labour) are
also in favour of the free movement of
labour and a more generous immigration
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policy as a whole. Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland have different interests in
relation to agriculture and energy. Scotland
has a strong interest in oil and gas and a
commitment to renewable energy. All of
these could put the devolved administrations
in opposition to positions taken by the UK
in EU negotiations.
The issue of the role of the devolved admin-
istrations in Europe will thus remain a live
one. With increasing differences, there will be
calls for a stronger role for Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland in setting UK European
policy. This parallels demands for stronger
and more formal intergovernmental mecha-
nisms within the UK, pointing towards a
more federal conception of the state.
These post-referendum scenarios will not
play out in a vacuum. Indeed, the constitu-
tional transformations in the UK are set
within a wider context of a changing EU.
Similar territorial re-conﬁgurations are taking
place in other EU member states, where
there is contestation over internal territorial
boundaries and the level of autonomy
afforded to these territories. These devolu-
tion experiences across the EU inspire—and
take inspiration from—each other so that the
repercussions of the EU referendum will be
felt beyond the UK.
Conclusion
The outcome of the forthcoming EU referen-
dum will play into two constitutional stories
in the UK. It will determine whether the
UK’s future will be inside or outside the EU.
Also, it will have implications for the future
of the United Kingdom as a union of four
nations. This is so whether a ‘Leave’ or
‘Remain’ outcome is returned.
The territorial differentiation within the
UK is characterised by varying levels of leg-
islative and judicial autonomy enjoyed by
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The
four nations also hold distinct political prior-
ities, in function of their size, socioeconomic
status, key industries and historical legacies.
This distinctiveness is visible in the multi-
dimensional nature of the relationships
between the constituent parts of the UK and
the EU: Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast are
themselves actors in Brussels, where they
seek to pursue their own political priorities
that may or may not be aligned with those
of London.
It is hardly surprising, then, that the
devolved administrations have been increas-
ingly vocal about the UK’s future relation-
ship with the EU and the particular impact
any changes would have upon them, touch-
ing on devolved and non-devolved policy
areas. However, this appears broadly to
have fallen on deaf ears in London. There is
little to suggest there has been clear and
decisive action to incorporate these voices
within the EU renegotiation discussions; and
little to indicate that there is any real sensi-
tivity to the implications of the vote upon
the future constitutional make-up of the UK.
That there will be a knock-on effect is, how-
ever, beyond doubt.
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